analysis from the communication perspective in the healthcare application. Finally, conclusions close the paper.
Background

Security in Wireless Communication
Security in short-range wireless networks is based on elements on various layers of communication. Confidentiality, authenticity and integrity are typically secured with cryptographic algorithms and security protocols on physical, link, network or application layers. Availability can be secured on the physical layer with spread spectrum technologies, e.g. frequency hopping and direct sequence spread spectrum, which makes radio signals more difficult to follow, intercept and jam.
Ubiquitous wireless networks consist typically of low-cost devices, including wearable or implantable health sensors and non-medical devices with small batteries and limited UI capabilities. These energy and user interaction restrictions lead to compromises in the security architectures and protocols, e.g. by selecting weaker algorithms or ignoring security in communication. Furthermore, it is challenging to establish security relationships for devices without pre-shared keys or capabilities for inputting passkeys. Consequently, security standards for wireless communication have adopted different security pairing models.
Fortunately, the limited range of wireless communication can offer a security advantage. Intuitively, the attacks, where an attacker must be in close proximity to hear and intercept communication, are more difficult to implement and easier to detect, particularly in controlled physical spaces like homes. On the other hand, proximity can also give a false sense of security as signal-to-noise ratio in longer distances may be underestimated and attackers may invent stealth invasion means. Recently, the research on information-theoretic security has promised new opportunities to achieve high security with low processing costs -without requiring expensive cryptographic algorithms. For instance, secrecy coding [4] and intentional jamming [5] solutions have been proposed for controlling signal-to-noise ratio towards potential eavesdroppers without interfering legitimate transmissions. Further, radio access technologies, such as frequency hopping and interleaving, can be secured by keeping hopping sequences and scrambling keys confidential [6] . Integrity and authenticity can be addressed with distance bounding [7] or RF fingerprinting [8] solutions. Physical proximity of devices and location dependent characteristics of radio signals are used to establish secret keys and trust between devices [9] [10] [11] .
Ubiquitous health application example
In the ubiquitous environment, the same application is able to utilize various communication techniques. This sub-section presents a motivating example that shows how the Bluetooth, ZigBee and NFC relate to a ubiquitous healthcare application, i.e. a telecare application. The term telecare refers a situation where elderly people are supported with technology in order to support their living at a home as long as possible. Figure 1 shows an imaginary situation in a home telecare environment. The home environment contains Bluetooth, ZigBee and NFC devices alike, and in addition, the server that maintains devices and connections. ZigBee sensors are utilised for safety purposes, e.g. an occupancy detector to recognize if the occupant has left the house in unusual time. Health monitoring devices collect data from the occupant -the collected data is delivered via the server to a nurse for further analysis. The health monitoring devices can be based on both Bluetooth and ZigBee. For the health monitoring, the occupant identifies herself by means of NFC. This ensures that health data is connected to the right person, e.g. in a situation when a spouse utilizes the same monitoring devices. Furthermore, the environment contains an NFC tag to establish a call for the nurse, which facilitates occupant's possibilities to get help when needed. During the call, the Bluetooth video camera is utilised to offer additional information for the nurse. 
Figure 1. Example telecare situation
The home telecare case contains various wireless connections, which together facilitates occupants living in home. However, a security breach in any of these connections is able to cause significant harm. The exposure of medical data or treatment information is a serious privacy violation. Furthermore, inaccurate data, which is manipulated, delayed or originates from the wrong person, is able to cause incorrect diagnosis and treatments. Even minor breaches are able to ruin occupants' and nurses' trust for the system, which reduces the utilisation of the whole system.
Several researchers have defined security requirements (e.g. [12, 13] ) and frameworks (e.g. [14, 15] ) for ubiquitous and wireless healthcare applications. However, thorough risk analyses on how well existing ubiquitous technologies (including standards, practical implementations and potential enhancements) would fulfil these requirements are not done.
Systematicity via security metrics
Sufficient Security effectiveness (SE) is the ultimate goal of security work. SE is the assurance that the stated security objectives (SOs) are met in the target system and the expectations for resiliency in the use environment are satisfied, while the system does not behave other than intended [16] . The security controls resulting from SOs and risk management activities should aim at sufficient SE.
Security is very difficult to manage without suitable tools in real-world applications due to the complexity of nowadays's systems, value networks and use scenarios. Models based on security metrics are an effective tool for security engineering and decision-making.
Security metrics should be capable of offering effective evidence of SE. This means that they should express how effectively actual risks are mitigated in the system [17] . Sufficient and highquality risk knowledge is a pre-requisite for security metrics development. It is not possible to measure security as a whole, but it is feasible to measure factors contributing to it [18] . In [18] , we proposed basic and integrated strategies for security measurement objective decomposition for top-down risk-driven security metrics development and management. The basic strategies address security configuration correctness, direct partial security effectiveness and software and system quality. The integrated strategies support compliance with best practices and regulations, pure security effectiveness, and security effectiveness tradeoffs.
In ubiquitous health applications, the main security objectives concern authentication at different levels, authorization, data integrity and confidentiality, privacy and availability [19] . Metrics development should address separately end user authentication, sensor authentication, and the service provider user authentication [17] . In the end-user authentication, communication is patient-centric, and includes e.g. paramedic, smart home and mobility scenarios. Service provider user authentication involves use of several communication channels. Privacy measurement in healthcare system is needed because healthcare data is strictly regulated. It should be noted that in some paramedic scenarios, all security objectives cannot fully be met -availability concerns can override them. This should be also reflected to security metrics.
Security of Bluetooth, ZigBee and NFC
Bluetooth
Bluetooth establishes wireless ad-hoc networks by means of short range radio. The Bluetooth network is called a piconet, which uses a masterslave structure as presented in Figure 2 Bluetooth is applied to connect peripherals to computers and mobile devices. Bluetooth development is started already in 1994. IEEE Standard 802.15.1 [20] covers physical and MAC layers while the Bluetooth specifications [21] In the Bluetooth, Link Manager Protocol (LMP) manages security features of the Bluetooth link [22] . Consequently, security services are enforced on the link layer. The Bluetooth supports authentication, confidentiality, integrity and authorization security objectives. Authentication of Bluetooth devices bases on challenge-response mechanisms -and it can be utilized to offer one way or mutual authentication of devices. For the authentication purposes, a link key is required, which is established by pairing devices. Secure Simple Pairing (SSP) standard proposes alternative means for pairing by: comparing (or inputting) strings, which devices display; using out-of-band solution (e.g. touching NFC devices); using PIN in legacy devices; or just connecting devices without security checks (unauthenticated mechanism). The link key is utilised also in encryption to achieve communication confidentiality. In typical implementations, authorisation and trust are closely related in the Bluetooth, i.e. devices are either trusted or untrusted. Trusted devices have full access to services from other devices, whereas each request from untrusted devices must be explicitly authorised by the end-user. [23] Bluetooth contains four security modessupported modes vary between Bluetooth versions. Mode 1 does not use any security mechanisms. Mode 2 provides service level security (after link establishment), whereas, mode 3 supports link level security (before link establishment). Lastly, mode 4 supports service level security by utilizing SSP to get the link key. Added to these four security modes, Bluetooth security is affected by three encryption modes and three service security levels. Firstly, encryption mode 1 defines that encryption is not used, while mode 2 defines that communication to particular address is encrypted. Finally, encryption mode 3 enforces encryption to all traffic. In contrast, service security levels focus on authentication and authorization. Level 1 requires authentication and authorization alike, while, in level 2 authorisation is not mandatory. Service security level 3 does not require authentication at all and access is automatic. [23] Hence, Bluetooth contains several models and levels for security. Together these different parameters increase probability of implementation errors that might ruin achieved security.
ZigBee
ZigBee aims to create a network for low data rate and long battery life requirements, e.g. for purposes to send periodic data from a sensor to other device. In ZigBee devices, battery life has to be at least two years. The ZigBee is applied for instance in a home automation and the collection of medical data. The ZigBee network is a mesh network and the communication range is up to 75 meters. The development started in 1998 and its IEEE standard 802.15.4 [24] appeared in 2003. The ZigBee Alliance [25] that defines the ZigBee specification is established in 2004. Two stack profiles for the ZigBee exist, i.e. ZigBee and ZigBee PRO. The first one is intended for home and light commercial usage, while the latter one is intended for situations with higher security requirements. Figure 3 shows network topologies utilised in ZigBee networks -C denoted a ZigBee coordinator whereas R means a ZigBee router. In the star structure all communication goes through the coordinator. In the tree structure communication goes up and down, while in the mesh structure even the horizontal communication is possible. The ZigBee coordinator is the most capable device with several tasks. For the security purposes, the coordinator acts as a trust centre and stores security keys. The coordinator authenticates joining devices, manages network keys and enables end-to-end security between devices. Added to coordinators and routers, ZigBee network can contain ZigBee end devices, which are the simplest nodes in the network.
ZigBee uses security offered by IEEE 802.15.4, i.e. security for the physical and MAC layers. Standard supports alternative physical layers, providing spread spectrum and thus some potential for making signal interception attacks more difficult. Key definition and management take place in the higher layers defined by the ZigBee Alliance. In ZigBee, replay attacks are mitigated by utilizing counters to check freshness of input /output traffic in each device. Authentication is supported in device and network level alike. The utilisation of common network key supports network level authentication, while, individual devices are authenticated by means of link keys. Communication integrity is supported with Message Integrity Codes (MIC). AES with 128 bit keys is utilised to achieve communication confidentiality. Encryption occurs in the network level and between devices. In ZigBee, the security of network depends on a master key. Thus, achieving the master key threatens the whole network. Moreover, Link keys and Network keys are utilised in the ZigBee network.
Previous studies have investigated ZigBee security from the protocol (IEEE 802.15.4) and manufacturers' implementation viewpoints [26] . The most security risks were found from the manufacturers' implementations, as predictable. The main categories of attacks against ZigBee networks are physical attacks, key attacks and replay / injection attacks. ZigBee supports long battery life but jamming attacks are able to ruin this feature. For example, in [27] Vidgren et al. present how to prevent the utilisation of a sleep mode in order to causes power failures. Moreover, the utilisation of key attacks is presented in [26, 27] . Key attacks utilise commercial traffic analysing devices and analysing tools to obtain the network key. [30] [31] [32] . Haselsteiner et al. [33] proposed a key extraction solution, which is based on eavesdropper inability to determine direction of NFC transmissions. Active attacks have been addressed in [34] with distance bounding protocol and in [35] with integrity codes. Distance bounding is based on detecting round-trip delays caused by active man-inthe-middle attackers. Integrity codes use observation that attackers cannot easily change NFC transmitted '1' bits into a '0' and, hence, communication can be coded to detect tampering. Fingerprinting methods to detect counterfeits and cloned devices are proposed in [36, 37] .
Madlmayr et al. [38] describe following seven threat types for the NFC: Denial of Service (DoS), Relay data transferred over the RF, Skimming of applications in the secure element, Managing indevice security, Transactions over NFC peer link, Issues due to the fixed unique ID and Phishing. In other words, absent controls for authentication, integrity and confidentiality are security challenges related to NFC applications. However, from the integrity viewpoint data corruption is much easier than data modification as described in [33] . In [11] Cavoukian describes NFC threats from different usage scenario viewpoints with applicable mitigation techniques. Moreover, author identifies following residual risks: risks arising from modified or misbehaving tag, risks arising from poor application implementation and risks arising from interoperability problems in hardware and platform.
WiFi
Wireless Fidelity (WiFi) is a widely used wireless local area network technology defined by IEEE. WiFi's security specification -WiFi Protected Access 2 (WPA2) [39] -defines authentication procedures and alternative security protocols for confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity.
In WiFi security architecture, an authenticator (typically an access point) controls which supplicants (terminals) are allowed to access the network. In larger multi-user deployments, authenticators can be connected to centralized authentication, authorization, and accounting services. In the WiFi protocol stack, the security mechanisms locate between the medium access control layer and the physical layer. Both unicast and multicast communication can be secured using pairwise and group keys, respectively. Key establishment on smaller networks is based, typically, on pre-shared secrets. Additionally, alternative mechanisms, which have been specified in WiFi Protected Setup (WPS) [40] , include: 8 digit PIN entry, 'push button' model, and out-of-band channels such as NFC.
In the early 2000 various vulnerabilities [41] were found from predecessors of WPA2. More recently, weaknesses have been pointed out also in WPA2 and WPS. These include for example, a WPA2 insider attack called 'Hole196') [42] and a brute-force attack against some WPS implementations [43] . Also, as WPS 'push button' mechanism is unauthenticated, it is vulnerable for man-in-the-middle attacks -any nearby device may establish a key with another if the user has conditioned the device by pressing a button. A man-in-the-middle attack succeeds if an attacker can intercept communication from another device so that the base station sees only one device, the attacker, wishing to connect.
In many cases, application and physical layer approaches complement the WiFi security. Application layer approaches provide end-to-end security for long-range connections. In the physical layer, different radio access technologies (such as spread spectrum) have a potential to complicate signal interception and jamming attacks. However, various physical layer attacks have been published (e.g. [44, 45] ) and physical layer cannot be considered secure. The WPA2 protects only payload part of the communication and leaves identifiers and header information unprotected [46] . Consequently, the use of static cleartext addresses in advertising and registration procedures leaves users vulnerable for tracking attacks. Similarly, unprotected capability and channel state information, which are needed for establishing a wireless channel, make communication vulnerable for interception and denial of service attacks. In the future, new physical layer approaches may be adopted to increase WiFi security including more protected channel establishment [45] and beamforming to control users' and eavesdroppers' signal-to-noise ratios [46] .
Risk analysis
This section describes our RA method and analyses risks in wireless applications. First, the RA method is described in sub-section 4.1. Thereafter, the method is utilized for ubiquitous healthcare application -presented in sub-section 2.2 -in order to analyze its risks.
Applied risk analysis process
The Risk Analysis is a process to find all relevant security risks for a product under the investigation. The Risk Analysis makes it possible to select security controls systematically and with justifications. The most important security concepts for the RA process are presented in Figure 4 . An asset (as defined by Common Criteria [47] ) is an entity that someone presumably places value upon. Hence, the asset can be almost anything that needs protection. A threat is potential for an accidental or intentional security violation [48] . Threats are enabled by vulnerabilities. Based on [48] a vulnerability can be defined as a property or weakness in a system or its environment that could cause a security failure. Lastly, security controls are a means to protect assets and to support the particular security objective by mitigating risks. For an asset different security objectives are required due to potential threats. Security controls decrease and threats increase the risks It should be noted that the literature includes various RA methods, such as [48] and [49] . However, the description of their use for security engineering, security decision-making and security monitoring remains often vague. In the following, we describe our RA process that has been successfully utilized experimentally in our RA projects, enhanced with support for the above-mentioned use. Figure 5 presents the steps of the risk analysis process. The first step is Risk identification. Often, the Risk identification is a brainstorming session where stakeholders with different backgrounds identify risks. It is of utmost importance that risk identification contains technical, business and enduser perspectives. Without all these aspects present at sufficient level, the RA results do not enable informed security decision-making. Conceptually (cf. Figure 4) , the Risk identification step produces risks and threats alike.
Next, the identified risks are prioritized. The prioritization is performed by estimating severity and probability of occurrence values for each identified risk, resulting to a risk index estimate. The severity value indicates how serious consequences are if the risk is realized. In contrast, the probability value indicates how often the risk realizes. From the concept viewpoint, the Risk prioritization utilizes information about vulnerabilities and assets (cf. Figure 4) . As the final output, the Risk prioritization produces the list of risks in the importance order.
Risk identification
Risk prioritization
Defining security objectives
Defining security controls Defining security metrics
Figure 5. Risk analysis process
In the third step security objectives are defined. Security objectives describe what kind of security is required from the system. In other words, objectives are high level security requirements for the system. Security objectives are often classified into confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication, authorization and non-repudiation categories. The objectives can relate to users (e.g. user authentication), services (e.g. service availability), communication (e.g. communication confidentiality), etc. Security objectives for the system are defined based on risk prioritization results. For instance, the identified risk Measurement result is modified may cause the security objective Data storage integrity. The security objective definition starts from the most critical risks. However, it is common that risks have interdependencies with each other. A particular challenge is that, risk that has got low priority in the Risk prioritization phase can be an enabler for other more critical risks. Consequently, risk interdependencies have to be analyzed and taken into account during the security objective definition. They should be also revised in an iterative way after the brainstorm-driven RA explained here. Iteration is needed when there are impactful changes in (i) design and implementation information, (ii) use scenarios of the target system, or (iii) the threat landscape.
The fourth step is to define security controls. As depicted in Figure 4 security controls support security objectives, and in addition, protect assets. Consequently, security controls mitigate security risks. On the one hand, security controls can be technical means to support the particular security objective. For instance, the utilization of encryption in the communication supports communication confidentiality. On the other hand, security control can be a process that defines practices how the designed product has to be used. As a simple example, it can be defined that passwords are not written in a paper. Hence, defined security controls are implemented in the designed product, or alternatively, security controls steer the utilization of the product after the implementation.
The last step defines security metrics. By means of the security metrics it is possible to build a feedback loop for the Risk analysis process. Hence, metrics are utilized to recognize residual risks. It is common that all risks are not identified in the first round, or alternatively, defined security objectives do not cover all identified risks. Thus, metrics are intended to recognize deviations between the achieved and required security. The feedback produces by security metrics are utilized in the next risk analyzing round.
RA for ubiquitous healthcare application
We have performed risk analysis for the healthcare application presented in sub-section 2.2. In the risk analysis over 50 security risks were identified -varying from business aspects to specific technologies. Table 1 lists risks from the network viewpoint. The majority of risks are enablers for other risks, i.e. other risks arise due to the network risks. Examples of security vulnerabilities, countermeasures and security metrics related to these risks in wireless networks can be found from Table 2 .
The risk analysis reveals that the properly working network is the backbone for the ubiquitous healthcare application. Therefore, risks arising from network failures are in the first priority. Several reasons are able to cause network failures, and thus, it is difficult to eliminate this risk as the whole. Hence, it is mandatory to include mechanisms to detect and recover from network failures. In a telecare application detecting network failures remotely is more reasonable mitigation technique for network failures than building a redundancy, which cause unreasonable costs for patients. DoS (called jamming in lower network layers) is also a critical risk. This risk might be realized in lower or higher network layers. In the higher layers, server is loaded heavily, and thus legitimate users are not able to get service. In contrast, jamming in the lower layers causes that the communication channel is reserved and devices are not able to send data. In addition, active attacker might follow and jam frequency hopping of a communication channel. Bluetooth and ZigBee act in the same frequency band, and thus, in theory an appropriate jamming device prevents the utilisation of both networks. Similarly, Bluetooth and ZigBee devices are able to affect each other, as well as other devices acting in the same frequency band. However, an intentional jamming attack requires a modified device, which reduces a probability of this risk. On the other hand, Bluetooth or ZigBee device can be utilised for critical monitoring purposes, which in turn increases consequences of risk realization. For the ZigBee devices DoS / jamming attacks are able to ruin battery lifetime, which causes power failures. In contrast, preventing jamming in NFC is difficult. NFC contains a collision detection mechanism, which helps to recognize jamming. However, this does not help a user whose NFC bandwidth is reserved when she tries to get help via the healthcare application.
Risk #3 relates to configuration errors. Bluetooth and ZigBee contain various configuration parameters and key management issues. Improper network configuration may cause that achieved security is lower than required, or alternatively, sensors send measurement data for a wrong server etc. In order to decrease the probability of configuration errors applications and updates have to be tested thoroughly.
Risk arising from data integrity may also have various consequences. For instance, nursing staff do not get the correct opinion from the patient, or alternatively, alarms are not triggered. Bluetooth and ZigBee contain mechanisms for communication integrity, whereas NFC does not support it. In NFC data corruption is much probable integrity problem than data modification [33] . This is due to challenge to change the particular bit from the wireless signal. Similarly, in Bluetooth and ZigBee it can be assumed that message modification during the communication is quite unlikely. To avoid integrity risk arising from the physical layer it is reasonable to utilise integrity checking in higher network layers.
Improper authentication and access control are source for several risks with varying consequences. Investigated techniques do not concentrate on user's authentication or access control. Instead means to authenticate and authorize communicating devices and networks are available in Bluetooth and ZigBee. In contrast, NFC does not support these security objectives as such, but those can be offered by From the viewpoint of lower network layers, studied technologies do not offer much support for security, i.e. Bluetooth, ZigBee, NFC or Wi-Fi do not contain security mechanisms in the physical layer. In other words, support for security objectives is built in higher layers -starting from the protocol definitions. One reason for this is that supporting all security objectives by means of physical layer mechanisms is not possible. On the other hand, some risks can be also realized from the application layer. For instance, the utilisation of default passwords is a remarkable risk even on the lower layers but which cannot be mitigated by means of physical layer mechanisms. Hence, an appropriate password change policy on the application layer is able to increase security on the lower layers also. Therefore, as the cross-cutting quality, security has to be supported through all layers in order to achieve security in the ubiquitous application.
From the ubiquitous computing viewpoint, Bluetooth, ZigBee and NFC are reasonable techniques. Each technique can be applied in the ubiquitous applications as long as known security restrictions are taken into account already at designtime and compared to the requirements from the application domain. For example, in ZigBee wake-up time is shorter and battery life-time longer than in Bluetooth, which supports its utilisation in applications that require this kind of availability. In all cases it is reasonable to utilise minimum communication ranges and directed antennas in order to minimise outsiders' possibilities to recognise wireless traffic.
Conclusions
We analysed security challenges and solutions of Bluetooth, ZigBee, NFC, and Wi-Fi technologies. The focus of the analysis was lower network layers. According to the analysis, the main threats at the physical layer are jamming and eavesdropping. However, it is visible that these communication techniques do not offer physical layer mechanism to mitigate these threats. On the other hand, these threats can be mitigated by utilising upper layer mechanisms. Bluetooth, ZigBee, NFC, and Wi-Fi are widely applied in various ubiquitous computing applications.
In addition, we carried out a risk analysis for a healthcare application, which utilises above mentioned communication techniques. Risk analysis revealed that risks arising from networking are enablers for other risks, and thus, it is vital to mitigate recognised risks. The risk analysis method applied was also described. The method includes application of its results to security engineering, decision-making and monitoring via use of security metrics.
